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RESUMEN 
Se analizan las funciones de la comunica-
ción informal en la protección de la iden-
tidad social. Se describe la culpa y ver-
güenza colectiva, la asociación entre la 
influencia de información referente y la 
credibilidad del rumor, y la validez eco-
lógica de la transmisión triádica como 
opuesto a la transmisión persona a perso-
na respecto al proceso social de memoria. 
La reproducción serial se concibe como 
un paradigma para estudiar representa-
ciones sociales de pasado o la memoria 
colectiva. También se analizan datos an-
teriores y teorías en relación con las Co-
misiones de la Reparación de las viola-
ción de los derechos humanos.  
ABSTRACT 
We discuss the functions of informal 
communication in protecting social iden-
tity and dealing with collective guilt and 
shame, the association between referent 
information influence and rumour credi-
bility, and the ecological validity of the 
triadic transmission as opposed to the 
person-to-person transmission in relation 
to social process of memory. Serial re-
production is conceived of as a paradigm 
to study social representations of past or 
collective memory. Previous data and 
theories are also discussed in relation to 
Truth and Reparation Commissions that 
deal with collective human right viola-
tions. 
Key words: collective guilt, informal communication, social process of memory 
 
 Queens, New York, is known to most people, even outside the United 
States. What less people know, is that Queens is associated with the name 
of Catarina of Bragança, the sister of a XVII century Portuguese king. Re-
cently, the New York Portuguese community arranged for a statue of Ca-
tarina to be erected in Queens, to celebrate her ruling there. What less Por-
tuguese people did know is that Catarina was associated to slave trading. 
However, the Queens’ African-American community was aware of it and 
the statue is now waiting for a new plan. Undoubtedly, the African-
American and the Portuguese communities in Queens agree that slavery is 
one of the most immoral endeavours in human history. Nevertheless, it is 
likely that, from the standpoint of their historical identities, the two groups 
stand on quite different grounds. The negative feelings of contemporary 
African-Americans towards slave traders who brought African people to 
the 17th and 18th century America is more than legitimate. But, contempo-
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rary Portuguese are not proud of remembering their slave trader ancestors 
who clearly threaten their image as a group. 
 
Collective guilt and shame 
The same may apply to other former colonial countries, such as Spain. 
In fact, Spain has a more negative historical stereotype than Portugal: so 
called Black Legend attributes to Spaniards an image of brutal and arrogant 
conquerors, in comparison to a more lenient historical stereotype of explor-
ers and more open minded settlers of Brazil. Spaniards have been blamed 
for many atrocities and these were real but it is fair to remind that Britain, 
Portugal and France were also involved in brutal colonial wars (Restall, 
2004; Thomas, 2004). 
In any case, Spaniards and Portuguese, as members of national groups, 
probably experience negative emotions like shame and guilt, as a conse-
quence of the negative groups´ history. Shame and guilt are conceived of as 
resignation emotions. Negative emotions are related to an appraisal of low 
control over events and usually lead people to reduce activities and to in-
ternal focus. People experience guilt when their personal behaviour is in-
consistent with their moral attitude and this emotion involves negative 
evaluation related to specific behaviours. 
Lazarus (1999) posits that the core relational theme for guilt is having 
transgressed moral rules or norms. Action tendencies related to guilt are 
reparative actions. Guilt also prevents from acting destructively against 
others. Shame is related to the failure of self or when the exposed self is 
found inadequate and is felt when a negative evaluation of the global self is 
involved. For shame the core relational theme is failing to live up to an 
ideal-ego or not reaching goals (Lazarus, 1999). The action tendency re-
lated to shame is wanting to hide or conceal actions. Shame leads to self-
improvement and to restore identity (Izard, 1993; Lewis, 1993). 
Guilt and shame have intra-group social functions: strength the bonds 
between members of a group. Shame encourages pro-social behaviour, 
conformity and responsibility. Guilt increases compliance and reinforces 
social bonds, with a sense of interpersonal obligation and empathy 
(Echeberría, 2000). 
These self-conscious emotions may be felt at group level, this means 
felt not as a consequence of personal experience, but as a consequence of 
the experience and behaviour of social categories like nation, ethnic group 
and so on. In guilt, attention is focused on collective behaviour: We (Ger-
man people) made this awful thing (Holocaust). Guilt’s main adaptive so-
cial function is to prevent interpersonal and inter-group exploitation. In 
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shame, attention is focused on the collective identity: We (German people) 
made this awful thing (Holocaust). Shames main social function is to re-
store collective positive identity. 
However, at the group level little difference is perceived between cha-
racterological (We German people...) and behavioural ( ...German people 
made...) attribution of negative collective events. Moreover, usually in front 
of negative in-group past collective behaviour subjects perceive lower level 
of control – and lower level of control of behaviours is associated with 
shame, as high control is related to guilt (Branscombe, Slugoski & Kappen, 
2004). This is why a negative past experience usually elicits both shame 
and guilt: for instance, university students belonging to the third generation 
after the WW II, report first, feelings of shame (65%) and second, feelings 
of guilt (41%) when thinking about the Holocaust (Rensman, 2004). 
This does not mean that collective guilt and shame are the same emo-
tional reaction. Guilt is strongly related to reparation and apology and 
shame is usually associated with tendencies to escape, hide or distancing 
motivation – like avoiding reminders of negative collective event, distanc-
ing from the in-group or punishment and derogation in-group black sheep 
members (Lickel, Schmader & Barquissau, 2004). Usually people feel col-
lective guilt when they categorise themselves in the group of perpetrators, 
perceive the group as responsible for negative actions that could have been 
controlled, actions are perceived as illegitimate and morally unjustifiable, 
harm done remains uncorrected and cost and reparative actions are not per-
ceived as costly or the harm impossible to repair (Branscombe, 2004).
 Guilt and, particularly, shame are usually felt by victims, because 
shame is related to negative outcomes that can not be controlled and, in 
public, portrays an image as weak, inferior or “tainted” by stigma – guilt 
and shame feelings related to massive women’s rapes in the war by loser 
nations soldiers are the prototype of this situation. Victims of human right 
violations, more than perpetrators, feel a lack of ability to control and lower 
responsibility for negative events. This explains why feeling shame is 
strongly related to being victimised and usually associated with anger to-
wards the perpetrator and retaliation tendencies, whereas anger is usually 
unrelated to guilt experience and aggression (Branscombe, Slugoski & 
Kappen, 2004). 
In spite of this important difference, guilt and shame reports covariate 
in self-report studies and both are social emotions that motivate against 
anti-social collective behaviour and reinforce compliance with norms and 
pro-social behaviour. Motivated by feelings of collective shame and guilt, 
people are inclined to restore a positive collective identity or make up 
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amends for their behaviour. Reparative and compensatory actions could 
serve to repair damaged inter-group and interpersonal relations and to re-
store in-group self-image (Hoffman, 1982). 
Wallbot and Scherer (1995) in their large cross-cultural study found 
that guilt is elicited by immoral behaviour and self attribution (internal 
factors) and that shame is elicited by “inappropriate” behaviour and more 
often by other people (external factors). In individualistic and low power 
distance cultures shame experiences are very similar to guilt experiences –
explaining why German subjects report at the same time shame and guilt. 
 Doojse, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead (1998) demonstrate that peo-
ple may experience socio-centric or collective guilt related to the behaviour 
of fellow in-groups members (Dutch confronted with their group’s colonial 
unfavourable past behaviour in Indonesia) even when they personally actu-
ally played no role in harming other national groups. Studies show in-
stances of collective guilt in different European, American and North-
African countries (Branscombe & Doojse, 2004). 
Of course, we are not talking about collective judicial guilt: as Jaspers 
posits from the point of view of law, only individuals can be guilty. This 
means that individuals assume responsibilities in trials and receive penal-
ties for crimes and not for collective guilt (Jaspers, 1947, quoted in Rosoux, 
2002). 
It is also important to be aware that attributions of collective guilt are 
also a weapon in ideological struggle. Social representations of past that 
feed violent conflicts focus on the rumination of in-group suffering usually: 
a) represent or define national in-group as a victim (We, Serbians, ex-
cluded, discriminated and attacked from the Middle Age to World Wars). 
b) national outgroups are defined as aggressors or perpetrators and the re-
sponsibility and guilt of real or symbolic current and past injuries are at-
tributed to these social categories (they, Croatians nazis and Muslims fas-
cists collaborators, killed our people and commit genocide in the WWII). c) 
Retaliation appears as legitimate, and social representations reinforce inter-
group aggressive action tendencies, war and collective violence being only 
a rational and justified response to past aggression of the out-groups and in-
group suffering (Rosoux, 2001b). 
However, in this text we analyze the role of collective guilt as part of 
in-group social representations of a negative past. Guilt and shame are con-
ceived of as the emotional side of collective responsibility. These emotions 
are related to constructive reparative actions at actual or symbolic level. On 
the other hand, collective criminal guilt implies the justification of penalty 
and aggression towards a whole social category, because their members 
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belong to a criminal nation or because subjects were bystanders of a crimi-
nal regime. 
Collective guilt and shame, as feelings related to collective and not per-
sonal behaviour, are more probable in new generations unconnected to 
historical crimes (Rensman, 2004). At the opposite of common sense, peo-
ple directly involved in collective traumatic events as perpetrators or pas-
sive bystanders, do not usually report guilt and shame and feel positive 
towards institutions involved in such human right violations. For instance, 
interviews with old guards of killing fields in Cambodia and murder gangs’ 
members of the Rwanda genocide, suggest that active participants did not 
feel guilt or regret (Hatzfeld, 2004). 
In the same vein, observers of immediate post-war years in Germany 
wrote about self-pity, fear and sadness felt by the population, but also 
stated that guilt was not a dominant feeling (Baier, 1988; Grosser, 1989). 
Only 5% of 80 Germans psychiatrist, psychologist and priest reported con-
fessions of WW II crimes of war (Bar-On, 1989). 
These observations of lower feeling of guilt were confirmed by repre-
sentative samples of public opinion: only 32% of a German survey in 1951 
answered that Germany carried the guilt for the war. In 1967 it was 62 %. 
Discussion around the role of the German Army and of “normal German 
people” in the genocide and human right violations arise in the sixties and 
particularly after the seventies and eighties: it was sons asking to their par-
ents and grandparents about what they did or not did during the WW II, in 
very critical manner. In the eighties and nineties most of the German popu-
lation (60%) was born after WW II. 
A recent survey (1995) shows that German people report lowest his-
torical proud (Do you feel proud of your nation history? Yes 8% in Ger-
many versus 34% general mean) of 23 European, American and Asian na-
tions. Such collective condemnation was possible because the younger 
generation viewed itself as different from the older generation and as un-
connected to the Nazi regime and II World War and at the same time feel 
involved, but not committed, to collective in-group violence. 
Austrian and Japanese samples show a medium high level of historical 
proud (40% and 33%), suggesting that in these cases collective guilt and 
shame in part related to WW II and genocide’s in Europe and Asia exist at a 
lower level (UNESCO, 2000). Cultural explanations of German learning 
versus Japanese amnesia refer to a dichotomy between cultures of shame, 
focused in public image and external punition, and cultures of guilt, related 
to internalised self-critic (Conrad, 2003). However, this argument could not 
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explain the case of Austria –nobody could argue that Austria is not a cul-
ture of guilt-. 
One plausible explanation for lower historical guilt is lower levels of 
institutional self-criticism in both nations facilitated by Allied political 
decisions: Hirohito Emperor was never judged as criminal of war despite of 
his involvement in Japanese Army commandment. Austria was designed as 
a victim of Nazi Germany in spite of high support of population to nazi’s 
regime and Holocaust. In Austria 6.000 war criminals were judged, but 
only 35 death penalty were executed, for a six millions of inhabitants – 
15% belonging to Nazi organisations. Trials were larger in Germany than 
in Japan: in Japan, for 74 millions of inhabitants, 28 leaders and another 
5.700 people were judged by war’s crimes by Allied trials, including 920 
death penalties until 1951 (Grosser, 1989). In Germany, for around 80 mil-
lions of inhabitants, 21 leaders and 15.000 other war criminals were judged 
by Allied trials. French, British and American Governments executed 800 
death penalties and probably a similar or higher toll by Russians –this 
means a ratio two to four times higher than in Austria and Japan. German 
trials judged 60.000 war criminals between 1947 and 1990 –even if only 
10% of them received low strong penalties and most of old nazis became 
successful citizens in the German post-war (Barahona, Aguilar and Gon-
zalez, 2001; Bourke, 2001; Laqueur, 1985). 
Another related explanation could be the lower assumption of responsi-
bilities: Japan and Austria reject responsibility of war crimes in Asia and 
Europe and rejected to paid in the case of Japan or paid lower reparation 
than Germany in the case of Austria, to their victims. These nations cope 
with a negative collective past by means of successful silence and denial, 
inducing a social representation of past that actively forgets national crimes 
(Olick & Levy, 1997). Even in the case of Germany, in a survey dated in 
2000, only 30% agreed with a guilt statement like ”German citizens sup-
ported the nazis and were involved...”. 40% believes that German people 
were passive bystander and 23% that they were victims of Nazis. 51% 
agrees with putting a final line over past and only a minority agrees with 
continued debate – 41% (Langenbacher, 2003). In spite of institutional self-
criticism, trials by German judges, laws against the denial of Holocaust and 
crimes against the humankind, current public opinion in Germany rejects 
collective guilt and agrees with forgetting the negative past (Rensman, 
2004). 
The present studies aim to analyse how group members deal with such 
threatening memories, from a social identity perspective, using studies of 
rumours, political history and experimental studies as resources to under-
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stand this social dynamic. There is evidence that group members norma-
tively construct recollections of relevant past events through informal 
communication (e.g. Halbwachs, 1992; Vansina, 1985). Informal commu-
nication may thus help structuring individual memories about the historical 
and actual patterns of inter-group relations (e.g. Halbwachs, 1992; Kaplan, 
1982; Kimmel & Keefer, 1991; cf. also Billig, 1990; Tajfel, 1978) and we 
will explore this issue first. 
 
Social Identity, Rumour and Collective Memory 
How does informal communication help people establishing a positive 
social identity? Research on rumours, which we see as an instance of in-
formal communication, may help answering this question, because cross-
generation oral transmission of informal history is one of the most impor-
tant processes related to how cultures and collective memory emerge, per-
sist and change. 
Rumour is a proposition for belief, passes from person to person, usu-
ally by oral transmission, without secure evidence being present. When 
statements refer to old times (like William Tell figure in Switzerland) ru-
mours are alike cultural legends, they are manifestations of collective 
memories. Moreover, themes of many rumours are long-lived and repro-
duce central values and symbols of culture. Rumours usually reproduce 
unofficial or alternative memories, like in the case of the long-lived idea of 
President Kennedy murder by a ruling class conspiracy, in spite of Warren 
Commission official statement of an individual murder (Rosnow, 1980). 
 Rumours are not only a manifestation of collective memory, but allow 
to understand informal social communication or communicative memory. 
Serial reproduction of rumour and information, like in classic Bartlett or 
Allport and Postman studies, is a paradigmatic contribution to the study of 
social representations of history or collective memory (Schaller & Crandall, 
2004; McIntyre, Lyons, Clark and Kashima, 2004). 
Traditionally, rumour research focused on the factors that reinforce ru-
mour transmission and processes through which rumours distort facts (All-
port & Postman, 1947a; Difonzo, Bordia & Rosnow, 1994; Kapferer, 1987; 
Knapp, 1944; Ohja, 1973; Peterson & Gist, 1951; Rosnow, Esposito & 
Gibney, 1988). Rosnow (1991) meta-analysis found that personal anxiety, 
related to emotional tensions associated to the topic, is the first predictor of 
rumour transmission: r=.44. 
Our study in five European regions and five rumour also found that 
anxiety (how anxious do you feel when you hear the rumour for the first 
time?) was an important predictor of rumour transmission (meta-analytic 
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r=.40, Paez & Marques, 1999). Probably the more stressful, fearful or nega-
tive emotion arousing the situation, the more likely it is to reinforce rumour 
transmission. Second predictor of rumour transmission was credulity or 
trust in the rumour, related to the credibility or veracity of content and 
source of rumour: r=.30. In our synthesis credibility or veracity (How sure 
you feel about the veracity of the rumour the first time you hear about it?) 
was also important, r=.21. 
Rumour, urban legends, oral stories about collective past, are more 
transmitted depending on whether the teller finds it trustworthy. Uncer-
tainty or situational ambiguity is the last predictor of rumour transmission 
(Rosnow effect size r=.19 and our r=.21). Historical rumour flourishes in a 
social climate of uncertainty because it attempts to relieve the tension of 
cognitive unclarity.  
Another important predictor that appears in rumour theories is the rele-
vance or thematic importance. Two studies found that subjects spread more 
unimportant rumours: rumour was more passed by subjects who perceived 
the topic or theme as lower rather than higher in importance. This suggests 
that probably rumours about topics that involve the collective self or are 
related to value or relevant out-comes for the in-group tend to elicit more 
critical examination. Finally, empirical data show that the tendency to ac-
cept or believe on a rumour increased as a function of having heard them. 
In our synthesis study on rumour, one of the most important predictor of 
rumour transmission was the number of people that tell the subject or talk 
with him about the rumour, r=.39 (Páez & Marques, 1999). Rumour repeti-
tion by a higher number of sources bolsters belief and supports retransmis-
sion.  
Concluding, based in rumour studies, transmission of informal informa-
tion about past group events should be positively related to negative affect 
arousal, to credibility or trust in the source and perceived kernel of truth of 
the content and to social persuasion or number of people that share with the 
subject about the rumour. On the other hand, relevance is also a moderator 
factor – relevant topics elicit more criticism and limit rumour transmission. 
More interesting than establishing the factor that reinforces rumour trans-
mission, however, is to analyse processes of information modification and 
their functions as an instance of informal social communication (cf. 
McCann & Higgins, 1990; Ng, 1990). 
Based on Bartlett’s (1932) analysis of memory processes, Allport and 
Postman (1945) argued that rumours operate through three distinct proc-
esses: (1) levelling or forgetting, i.e., the omission of information units in 
the course of serial transmission. (2) sharpening or selective recall, i.e. the 
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accentuation of some details and change in the structure of relationships 
among them as compared to the source materials and (3) assimilation or 
reconstruction, i.e., the modification of details, in order to increase coher-
ence between the message and the person’s beliefs. A review of studies on 
serial reproduction concluded that as information is passed along chains 
details tend to lose, descriptions of events and groups tend to become ab-
stracts, information tend to become stereotyped and conventionalised, fol-
lowing expectations, values and dominant attitudes (McIntyire et al, 2004). 
Omitting unfavourable details, accentuating favourable, to the detri-
ment of unfavourable details, and reconstructing negative events under a 
more positive light, has been observed both in rumour transmission and in 
recollections of historical events (cf. Baumesteir & Hastings, 1997; 
Marques, Páez & Serra, 1997). 1 As a case in point, the findings by Allport 
and Postman (1945, 1947a, 1947b) indirectly support the idea that these 
processes help protecting social identity. In describing an event involving, 
among other things, a White’s aggression to a Black, White participants 
discarded most secondary details, and reversed the roles of the central char-
acters in the course of serial transmission. In the end of the rumour-chain, 
the White character was portrayed as the victim, whereas the Black charac-
ter was given the role of aggressor. In addition, in a survey of one thousand 
different rumours, Knapp (1944) found that 66% were negative rumours 
about out-groups.  
Allport and Postman processes could be associated to specific forms of 
coping with negative past events. a) forgetting or levelling is related to 
dissociation from the group and event, in terms of omission, denial and 
silence about traumatic collective events, b) selective recall or sharpening is 
related to social creativity, by reframing, psychological distancing and 
similar forms of coping with past negative events; c) assimilation is related 
to positivistic reconstruction of negative past events. These processes re-
lated to information transmission, operate well as an individual or repeated 
reproduction (intra-personal or personal memory) level (Herman, 1997) as 
well as on a social level, at a collective and inter-personal social dynamics, 
like serial reproduction or cross generational rumours about past events or 
collective memory. As an example at societal and institutional level, Ro-
soux (2001a) shows how official memories in Germany and France accen-
tuate heroic narratives reinforcing proud and national cohesion. These 
memories emphasise past persecutions and martyrs, reinforcing fidelity to 
national goals and values, but conceal shameful past episodes. We will 
discuss these forms of coping in the framework of Social Identity Theory 
(SIT) and contemporary developments.  
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Social Identity and coping with a negative past 
 
Following social identity theory (SIT) people’s self-concept derives in 
part from the social groups to which they belong. National identity is a 
source of collective self-concept, self-esteem and collective emotions. Col-
lective feelings are sociocentric affects, this means emotions felt in relation 
to in-group behaviour that are evaluated in an inter-group context. For in-
stance, social or fraternal relative deprivation is a feeling of injustice re-
lated to perception that the In-group receives less than they merit in relation 
to other groups. 
On the basis of self-categorisation identity, people may experience guilt 
or shame as a result of group membership. People confronted with their 
national in-group negative past behaviour (e.g. raping and murdering Indian 
people), if they categorise themselves at the group level, because of deper-
sonalisation, should feel guilt and shame related to this threatening evi-
dence. Unable to perform compensatory behaviours related to guilt and 
shame action tendencies, because the past is difficult to change, subjects 
should show compensatory cognitive responses or cognitive coping behav-
iour (Doojse et al, 1998). 
When people belief that lower social status is fair or at least stable, and 
inter-group boundaries are rigid, facing threatening past events or occulta-
tion of negative identity is a reasonable strategy (as Nazis did in the forties 
in Germany and Austria). When social situation is similar to previous one, 
but boundaries are perceived as permeable, individual strategies of social 
mobility are possible. When lower status is perceived as fair and stable, but 
group boundaries are rigid, an in-group identification is high, and individ-
ual’s mobility is not possible, social creativity coping responses are com-
mon, including positive intra and inter-group comparison, partial re-
evaluation of the negative event or dimension, and construction of new 
dimensions. Finally, when social evolution questions the stability and justi-
fication of lower in group status, forms of social competition and global 
symbolic reconstruction appear as possible (Hogg & Vaughan, 2001). In 
the following table we show coping responses to a negative in-group past in 
the framework of social beliefs and identification with the in-group, using 
political history and particularly the German post war experience as an 
illustrative case: 
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Member of a group with a negative past 
Socio-psychological context Coping response 
Historical Studies Second Half XX Century: between ( ) 
Negative evaluation perceived 
as legitimate, stable, not possi-
ble social mobility and lower 
identification (Germany and 
Italy in the forties) 
Dissociation:  
a) dissociation of group and collective past by means of 
forgetting, silence and denial of credibility and relevance 
of information and minimisation of affective arousal 
Negative evaluation perceived 
as legitimate, stable, lower 
identification and social mobil-
ity is possible (Germany in the 
fifties, during the cold war) 
Distancing from in-group: 
 b)psychological distancing and actual or symbolical social 
mobility, recategorization in another high status group or 
in a supra-category (we Europeans or free nations) 
Negative evaluation perceived 
as legitimate, stable but be-
cause of high identification or 
rigid group boundaries social 
mobility is not an alternative  
 
Social creativity by means of intra and inter-group com-
parison, redefinition of events and construction of new 
dimensions of evaluation 
c) Psychological distancing by means of: 1) agentic state 
or rejecting personal responsibility “we follow orders” 
(most of nazis’ in Nuremberg and post-war trials); 2) 
making in-group social comparison, specifically cutting of 
reflected failure and symbolic exclusion of extreme in-
groups perpetrators of human right violations (conserva-
tives like Adenauer in Germany fifties; French repression 
of collaborationist and myth of massive French Resistance) 
d) Defence of identity by means of social creativity: rede-
fining value of existing dimensions or re-evaluation of the 
negative collective past event by means of minimisation 
(lower relevance, credibility and low attributed frequency) 
and selective memory like focusing in “our suffering” or 
German as victims and Germans as perpetrators down-
played (German nationalist in forties and XXI century) 
e) Social creativity by means of new dimension of social 
comparison, on which the group may be evaluated more 
favourably, by means of reframing, selective attribution of 
causes and blaming the victims (German historians’ debate 
and nationalist Germans in the eighties) 
f) Social creativity by means of positive social comparison 
with an out-group doing worse (conservatives Germans 
comparing Stalinist and Nazis’ crimes) 
Negative evaluation perceived 
as only partial legitimate, uns-
table and the group has some 
status to use for social compe-
tition at least at symbolic level 
alternative (Italy, Austria and 
France in the 40-50s, as losers 
winners nations; Anglo-Saxons 
nations to WWII mass destruc-
tion in Japan and Germany) 
 Symbolic social competition,  
g) by means of a global positivistic reconstruction of nega-
tive past events (political lobbying for reconstructing the 
past, like Japanese politicians and historians reconstructing 
positively Japanese past) 
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Identification and intra-group comparison and social creativity  
When actual social mobility looks difficult, no cognitive alternative is 
afforded, because subjects believe the situation as stable and legitimate and 
share a high identification with the national group. Individuals following 
SIT groups tend to adopt social creativity strategies or cognitive coping, 
usually redefining the value of existing dimensions (minimization for in-
stance), constructing new dimensions (reframing for instance) or positive 
inter-group social comparison (comparison with a national group doing 
worse, for instance). 
Making the most intra-group comparison is another form of coping 
with a negative social identity, not included in cognitive strategies but im-
portant to cope with negative collective events. Another form is to consider 
individuals responsible for collective past traumatic extremely negative 
events, not typical from the in-group. In other terms, subjects construct a 
sub-type of in-groups black sheep that are devaluated and symbolically 
excluded. 
In the fifties, Adenauer’s policy in Germany is a instance of this form 
of coping: only the SS were supposed to be responsible of Human right 
violations, while German Army and German majority were conceived of as 
normal and moral people not committed to Nazi’s crimes. In fact, the 
Werhmacht was implicated in mass murders from the beginning of the war 
in Poland and more than 15% of the German and Austrian population was 
involved in Nazi organisations (von Plato, 1998). A 1995 German survey 
shows that 63% of people older than 65 years (cohort that experience the II 
WVS) believed that the Werhmacht was not involved in genocide and mass 
murders. However, 71% of younger generations believed in the Wehrmacht 
participation in mass murders during the II WVS (Pätzold, 1995). Of course, 
purge of black sheep are also complementary to global positivistic recon-
struction. 
Gaullist myth of massive French Resistance implies also the purge of a 
handful of wretches. In fact, about 9000 collaborationist people were killed 
in the wild purge of 1944 Summer. About 350.000 people were questioned 
in legal purge, 120.000 tried, 95.000 sentenced and 1.500 executed. About 
30.000 functionaries were penalized and 48.000 people condemned by in-
dignité nationale – a kind of public shaming and, in some cases, loss of 
civic rights. Purge was a massive social upheaval, however, it did not re-
form the state, it was slow and produced wide disparities –journalists and 
intellectuals were harshly punished and businessmen judged more leni-
ently. An amnesty was approved in 1953, in the frame of cold war (Baruch, 
2004; Rosoux, 2001b). 
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When individuals face a negative event related to national identity, per-
ceive that it is difficult to leave the group and identify strongly with the 
group, they usually try to alter the valuation of the group’s past –they could 
use cognitive alternatives or social creativity responses as SIT posits. 
First, if they cannot silence the crimes, perpetrators attack the credibil-
ity of their critics. Assignation of lower credibility to sources of informa-
tion about negative events is very common. Negationist literature about the 
Holocaust is a clear case in point. 
Second, minimisation of crimes is also very common. For instance, in 
Japan it is common to minimise the number of victims of the expansionist 
war in Asia 1930-1945. The official name of the II WW in Japan “Pacific 
War”, highlights the War against USA (1941-1945) and minimises the long 
period of fighting on the Asian mainland with its estimated toll of over 20 
millions Chinese victims (Conrad, 2003). In 1944, a spokesman for 
Franco’s Ministry of Justice admitted that over 190.000 people were exe-
cuted or died in prison –for a thirty million population. Historians posit that 
30.000 people disappeared in the first period of Francoist regime. The re-
pression, if not denied, was always dismissed by Franco’s regime as a le-
gitimate police operation (Preston, 2001). In Australia, the number of abo-
riginal children forcedly removed from their families in the past was mini-
mised as an attempt to at least decrease the perceived severity of harm done 
(Branscombe, 2004). 
Third, omission of some events and selective retention of others is very 
common. For instance, in the post-war years in Austria and Germany it was 
very common to remember human right violations (rapes, robbery, mur-
ders) provoked by the Red Army, but, at the same time it was usual to for-
get and not mention German Army’s rapes and human right violations in 
Eastern Europe. 20 million URSS citizens were killed, 57% of 3,3 million 
Russian prisoners of war died, 500.000 Jews were killed in the URSS and 
hundreds of thousands of civilians, communist militants and soviet officials 
were murdered (Kerschaumer, 1998). 
Another more complex social creativity coping response or cognitive 
alternative is to reframe the trauma: it was the war or it was understandable 
because of the characteristics of this era. Criminal of war Klaus Barbie’s 
final declaration in his trial is a good example of reframing human rights 
violations: ”I was never involved in mass repression in Izieu (village in 
which he was involved in mass murders). I hardly fought Resistance. I 
respect Resistance”. But it was the War and the War has finish-
ed”(Finkielkraut, 1989). Similarly, exaggerating the benefits that native or 
aboriginal victims received from colonisation in America, Africa or 
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Australia is common and helps to legitimate past in-group collective 
behaviour as less unfair, or simply just and fair (Branscombe, 2004; Licata 
& Klein, 2004). 
Emphasising one cause over others and blaming the victims are 
instances of this form of coping. German historian Nolte proposed in the 
eighties that Nazi’s concentration camps should be understood in the con-
text of an European civil war. Stalinist destruction of Russian bourgeois 
and kulaks and Gulag “cause” as a response Nazi concentration camps. The 
fact that a lot of Gulag victims were Jews and Bolsheviks or that Stalin 
tried to have stable relationships with Hitler’s regime were neglected. 
Another good example is the version of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic 
bombing, as a response for Pearl Harbour (Baumesteir & Hastings, 1997). 
Attribution of cause and responsibilities to the victims (victims brought 
it upon herself) is another form of cognitive coping and a way of maintaining 
a belief in a fair and meaningful world. In an 80’s survey, a third of the 
German population, and most of these over 40 years, are in total or partial 
agreement with the idea that "it is the Jews own fault if they have been 
persecuted for centuries" (Paez, Marques & Serra, 1997). The wife of a 
Russian civil servant who worked in concentration camp states, even in 1989, 
believed in a just world in relation to the gulag: "There were innocents who 
were unjustly jailed, that is true, but the rest, the majority, those were bandits" 
(Brossat et al, 2002). 
 
In-group vs Out-group membership, identification, stereotypes, recall 
 Not only studies on rumours and historical analysis, but also experi-
mental research confirm selective memory and recall reconstruction. At 
least two previous studies found that subjects recall better in-group positive 
behaviour and out-group negative behaviour (Alper and Korchin, 1952; 
Howard and Rothbart, 1980). 
 This selective recall could be understood as a normative mechanism 
that reinforces a positive social identity. In the same vein, and congruent 
with the SIT´s perspective, high identifiers with the national in-group 
should be more defensive in recalling past group behaviours. Subjects with 
a high in-group identification in front of negative national past should 
display more forms of coping and collective self defences than low 
identifiers, as Doojse et al’s (1998) study partially shows. In some case, 
high identifiers report more collective guilt, particularly when information 
is portrayed by important in-group sources that focus on the constructive 
reparative actions (Branscombe, 2004). However, in the case of Germany, 
qualitative and quantitative studies confirm that higher nationalist 
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identification is negatively associated to feelings of collective guilt and 
shame, and related to strong defensive attitudes and mechanisms – claiming 
collective victimhood and collective innocence for German people, blamed 
unfairly for their past (Rensman, 2004). 
 On the other hand, subjects could reject and show higher more defences 
in front of an out-group critical source, that sends a negative message about 
the historical past. Studies on the inter-group sensitivity show that people 
reject more criticism from out-group than from in group sources, because 
they attribute out-group criticism to envious motives and inter-group 
hostility. However, a critical message from an in-group source induces 
lower reactance, is agreed more and could have higher impact in collective 
behaviour, because criticism from in group sources are attributed to more 
constructive motives (Horney & Imani, 2004 ). Similar results were found 
in studies on collective guilt (Branscombe, 2004). 
 Finally, assimilation of expectancies, themes, values and stereotypes is 
common in informal transmission of information. Stereotypes are related 
both to inter-group conflicts and to defence of collective self-image, but 
also to a kernel of historical truth. As an example of the first process, 
Pakistanis students during the Indo-Pakistan war read a passage about the 
Indian army and reproduced it serially: each person retold it to other 
person, who in turn repeated it to another, and so on in an eight person 
chain. At the end, the final version reproduced the stereotype of the Indian 
Army as lazy and unprofessional (McIntyre, Lyons, Clark and Kashima, 
2004). Students from different countries asked about most prominent world 
historical events and leaders converged to mention a majority of 
eurocentric socio-political events and White European Males, particularly 
Second World War and Hitler. These results suggest that people reproduce 
stereotyped knowledge about what is important in history, including some 
kernel of truth –II WW and Hitler are prototypical instances of Wars and 
negative leaders (Liu, et al 2005). 
 
Implications for Truth and Reparation Commissions 
 These studies and theoretical discussions have some implications for 
social processes in political transitions from regimes involved in collective 
crimes to more democratic regimes (see also our empirical studies). How to 
deal and remember past collective crimes is a frequent problem. Truth, 
Justice and Reparation Commissions, like South-African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission are a common response. There have been more than 
20 official truth commission established around the world since the seven-
ties (Hayner, 2001). We will briefly expose some ideas related to these 
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collective ways of dealing with negative historical events associated to 
strong emotional reactions, particularly, those related to the problem of 
confronting past crimes and the collective learning of the truth. Acceptance 
of events is a first step towards the negotiation of a shared representation of 
the past. Acceptance of real facts, including others suffering, is essential for 
reconciliation, because acceptance of different meanings and pluralities of 
social representations about a collective catastrophe, does not imply to 
question the existence of a reality. What is important is to acknowledge the 
reality of crimes and victims, “to keep it from happening again...” but to 
forget the emotions of hate and not awaking ancients sufferings (Haynes, 
2001; Rosoux, 2001b). 
 First, absence of personal and collective guilt is a modal response in 
perpetrators of collective crimes and violence. It is not realistic to think that 
a majority of perpetrators should feel guilt and react with reparative and 
compensation behaviours towards victims. Denial, justification, and other 
forms of cognitive coping, allow perpetrators to share a positive collective 
identity and reject critics about human right violations. Only a minority 
feels guilt and an important group could display public guilt and shame, but 
only as compliance – public acceptance and private reject, as the case of 
Hitler’s minister Speer shows. Third generation of the perpetrators group 
could be more sensible and feel more guilt, shame and responsibility, than 
the generation involved in collective crimes. Even in this case, it is reason-
able to expect the presence of “defence mechanisms” oriented towards 
negation, minimisation and positivistic reconstruction of criminal collective 
behaviour. 
 Second, internal procedures should be more important for public opin-
ion than external trials and procedures. In Germany, Nuremberg Trial has a 
lower impact on public opinion than the normal action of German justice 
on human right crimes (Evans, 2003). Credible leaders are more able to 
gain population’s adherence to social representations of past that assumes 
past crimes and, errors, and, furthermore, can reinforce truth and reconcilia-
tion trends –like Mandela and Archbishop Tutu in South-Africa (Rosoux, 
2001 a,b). 
 Third, groups and societies are better and more accurate remembering 
and evaluating collective crimes of political, ethnic, cultural and ideological 
out-groups, than their own criminal collective behaviour. Societies forget 
more their negative behaviours and also remember and emphasise more 
positive aspects of their history. This means that external judges, historians 
and witnesses should be more accurate and less reconstructive – but at the 
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same time, their opinions could be less accepted by the group of perpetra-
tors. 
 Fourth, when dealing with the evidence of collective negative past be-
haviour, people should question the credibility of the sources. If critical 
sources are internal and appear as constructive, people would probably 
engage in positivistic cognitive coping. They would minimise emotional 
reaction and question the relevance of events – “these are old stories, they 
are not important in the present”. They would also frame in-group criminal 
behaviour as more understandable in the historical context, attribute nega-
tive and criminal behaviour to a minority of black sheep – extreme atypical 
members of the nation - and minimise frequency of criminal behaviours. 
Official reports should be able to overcome these collective defence 
mechanisms. 
 Fifth, more cohesive groups, with higher collective self-identity, should 
display more cognitive coping and should react more to Truth and Repara-
tion Commissions. Subjects highly identified with national and ethnic 
groups should reject critics strongly, particularly by means of minimisation 
of the frequency of in-group human right violations. At the opposite, na-
tions with lower level of collective self-esteem and collective proud should 
accept more critics and suggestions of reparation and compensatory ac-
tions. 
 Sixth, the tendency to punish a minority of criminals could be corre-
lated with a global positivistic reconstruction that denies the general apathy 
and diffuse global responsibilities – as the German case suggests. Even in 
this case, generations not involved in crimes could be reactive to historical 
critics and allow human right movement to demand truth, justice and repa-
ration. In these cases, self-criticism by in-groups high status sources are 
important. Good examples are recent historical exposition the German 
Army’s crimes that questions the Adenauer’s statement, reducing war 
crimes to a black sheep group of SS, or the official assumptions of viola-
tions of human rights by Argentina’s Army and Government officials or 
IRA self-criticism for the practice of political violence, particularly massive 
and indiscriminate murders. 
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